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WHY FLORIDA'S TAX REVENUES GO BOOM OR BUST,
AND WHY WE CAN'T AFFORD IT ANYMORE
JAMES A. ZINGALE* AND THOMAS R. DAVIES**
Florida has always been a boom-or-bust state, but its anti-
quated tax structure has exacerbated the harmful effects of eco-
nomic downturns on state government. With Florida undergoing
myriad population changes, future recessions will undermine the
state's ability to provide high-quality services. In this Article,
Doctors Zingale and Davies present the case for tax reform in
Florida. They analyze demographic changes, the nature of the
state's tax structure, and its reaction to the national business
cycle. The authors conclude that thorough tax reform is essen-
tial if Florida is to experience orderly growth.
N 1985, the Florida Legislature adopted a comprehensive
growth management plan which included goals, objectives, and
forecasts to guide the state's development.' The Act was intended
to "provide long-range policy guidance for the orderly social, eco-
nomic, and physical growth of the state."2 Its passage was an his-
toric event, a testament to Florida's desire to balance economic
prosperity with a high quality of life. Effective implementation of
the Act is a separate issue, however, given the Act's frank acknowl-
edgment of a truism: the State Comprehensive Plan will be imple-
mented only to the extent that its policies can be paid for.3 Raising
the money necessary to provide public services at a high level of
quality is steadily becoming more difficult. Florida is chafing under
an outmoded tax structure that will not generate enough revenue
to meet the state's needs, and that does not provide fiscal stability.
Two forces, neither of which can be controlled from Tallahassee,
endanger implementation of any long-term plan. The first force is
the national business cycle and its effect on the state. The eco-
* Staff Director, House Committee on Appropriations, Florida Legislature. B.S., 1968,
M.A., 1970, Bowling Green State University; Ph.D., 1975, Florida State University. Director,
Joint Legislative Management Committee, Division of Economic and Demographic Re-
search, 1980-1986.
** Assistant Executive Administrator, Florida Information Resource Commission. B.A.,
1973, Pennsylvania State University; M.S., 1974, Ph.D., 1977, Florida State University.
Chief Analyst, Joint Legislative Management Committee, Division of Economic and Demo-
graphic Research, 1980-1982.
1. Ch. 85-57, 1985 Fla. Laws 295.
2. Id. § 1 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 187.101 (1985)).
3. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 187.101(2) (1985)).
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nomic swings inherent in the business cycle produce sudden state
revenue shortfalls yet, at the same time, increase the demand for
state services. Although less sudden and dramatic, the second fac-
tor-demographic changes in the state's population-is equally
significant. A growing population and changes in the nature of that
population create demands the state is not able to meet under its
restrictive tax structure. Understanding these two factors, and
minimizing their disruptive effects on the delivery of public ser-
vices, is fundamental to the success of any strategic planning
process.
This Article focuses on these two forces-major economic and
demographic trends-and their influence on Florida's revenue and
service delivery systems. Its purpose is to assist lawmakers and the
public in understanding these forces and their effects on state
planning and budgeting. The authors explore historical informa-
tion to demonstrate how these forces have shaped Florida's past
and, when considered along with the official ten-year economic
forecasts, to provide an insight into their likely impact on Florida's
future. The Article concludes with a recommendation that the
state craft a better-balanced tax structure.
I. FLORIDA DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS
Perhaps more than any other single factor, the changing size and
composition of Florida's population will determine the state's pub-
lic policy agenda for the next decade. Just as the financial needs of
a single family are intimately linked to its demographic character-
istics, so are the state's future expenditure requirements affected
by the changing characteristics of its population. Thus, under-
standing Florida's changing demographics is essential for effective
long-term planning and budgeting.
A. Population Increase
Florida's population is increasing faster than that of the nation
as a whole. The state's population is expected to grow by 29.3%
between 1980 and 1990,4 compared to only 10.2% for the nation.'
4. Fla. Legis., Jt. Legis. Mgt. Comm., Div. of Econ. & Demographic Research, computer
printout (July 21, 1986) (actual and projected population and percentage change 1960-2000
for Florida) (printout on file, Florida State University Law Review) [hereinafter cited as
Florida demographic data].
5. Fla. Legis., Jt. Legis. Mgt. Comm., Div. of Econ. & Demographic Research, computer
printout (July 21, 1986) (actual and projected population and percentage change 1960-2000
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TABLE I
POPULATION GROWTH 1980-1990
FLORIDA AND U.S. COMPARISONS BY AGE GROUP
Age Group Florida U.S.
0-4 38.7% 17.4%
5-19 '7.5% (6.7%)
20-29 14.3% (1.8%)
30-59 39.4% 23.3%
60 and over 43.0% 18.7%
TOTAL 29.3% 10.2%
Source: Joint Legislative Management Committee, Division of Economic and Demo-
graphic Research.
The increase in Florida's population during the 1980's will re-
present 12% of the overall increase in the national population.' As
shown by Table I, some age groups-notably the very youngest
and oldest residents-will increase at a much faster rate than
others.
B. The Baby Boom Generation
The largest age group in the United States is the "baby boom"
generation, those born between 1945 and 1965.1 During the 1970
Census, this generation was in the school-age group, causing the
five to nineteen age cohort to peak at 59.8 million, an increase of
22.9% over the 1960 Census.' By the 1980 Census, the baby
boomers had flooded high schools, community colleges, and univer-
sities, significantly increasing demands on state education services.
Between 1990 and 2000, the baby boomers will move out of the age
class that traditionally depends on state services and into the
prime wage-earning age group. This change will reduce the pres-
sure on traditional higher education and criminal justice services,
but increase demand on such services as adult education.
Another effect of the baby boom generation is its "echo"-the
baby boomers' children. As the baby boomers have reached child-
for the United States) (printout on file, Florida State University Law Review) [hereinafter
cited as U.S. demographic data].
6. Florida's population is expected to grow by 2,851,076 between 1980 and 1990. Florida
demographic data, supra note 4. The total United States population is expected to increase
by 23,110,195. US. demographic data, supra note 5.
7. U.S. demographic data, supra note 5.
8. Id.
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bearing years, there has been a significant increase in births.9 Over
the next ten years this echo effect will increase demand for ele-
mentary and preschool services, neonatal care, day care, child sup-
port, foster care, and other child-related services. The impact on
state services will be similar to that of the baby boomers in the
1970's and 1980's.
C. Sixty-five and Older
Those age eighty and older will be the fastest-growing age group
in the United States over the next fifteen years.'i Florida is the
leading destination for older migrants. Between 1975 and 1980, the
state gained nearly 500,000 new residents aged sixty-five and older
through in-migration." Twenty-two percent of the net migrants to
Florida between 1975 and 1980 were sixty-five or older. 2 Another
twenty-one percent were between the ages of fifty-five and sixty-
four. 3 The eighty-and-over age group will continue to show rapid
growth over the next decade, causing continued service demands
for the elderly. The entire sixty-and-over population will grow
steadily and then accelerate as the baby boomers reach retirement
age.
The number and characteristics of the older migrants have a di-
rect impact on state government. For example, many older mi-
grants with incomes below the poverty level move to Florida. 3
This phenomenon creates needs for the low-income eld-
erly-housing, nursing homes, adult living facilities, and increased
Medicaid services. Although inbound migrants typically have a
higher socioeconomic status than those leaving the state, Florida
will have to address the needs of those who do come.
D. State Impact
These demographic forces will increase demand for state services
in many areas: education, correctional services, and aging and
adult services. The impact of these trends on state services is best
9. Linden, The Age of Growth, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, June 1984, at 4.
10. U.S. demographic data, supra note 5.
11. Longino, Migration Winners & Losers, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, Dec. 1984, at 27.
12. Smith, Florida, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, July 1985, at 46.
13. Id.
14. U.S. demographic data, supra note 5.
15. Longino, supra note 11, at 29.
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revealed by examining projected rates of increase in demand for
state services.
Although the rest of the nation will experience some relief from
growing student enrollments over the next several years,'6 Florida
will not. Between fiscal years 1982-83 and 1986-87, Florida public
school enrollments are expected to increase six percent' 7 and con-
tinue to grow through the 1990's.'8
In addition, the aging of Florida's population will place increased
demands on state funds. The impact on state health programs is
evident in growing Medicaid caseloads and expenditures. Between
fiscal years 1981-82 and 1985-86, state expenditures for Medicaid
services nearly doubled, increasing from $581.5 million to $1.1 bil-
lion.'" Expenditures and caseloads for the Aid to Families with De-
pendent Children (AFDC) program illustrate a similar growth pat-
tern. Between fiscal years 1981-82 and 1985-86, caseloads increased
12.6%, resulting in an overall budget increase of $86.7 million.20
Changes in Florida's population also will place increased de-
mands on correctional services. In fiscal year 1984-85, 28,310 in-
mates were incarcerated in state prisons.2' This number is ex-
pected to increase every year for the next decade, reaching 33,397
by 1995, an increase of 17.9% .22 Unless prison capacity is increased
significantly, Florida will be faced with a recurring prison over-
crowding problem for the rest of the decade.'
Furthermore, the prison population is affected by the number of
individuals between the ages of sixteen and thirty-five. In fiscal
year 1984-85, this age group accounted for 80.5% of those admit-
ted into the state prison system and 77% of the total Florida
prison population.24 The size of this cohort will continue to grow in
16. The national population of the 5-19 age group is anticipated to decline by 6.7% be-
tween 1980 and 1990. U. S. demographic data, supra note 5.
17. Memorandum from Martha Chang, Florida Department of Education, to Tom Da-
vies, Assistant Executive Administrator, Florida Information Resource Commission (May
21, 1986) (Florida FTE enrollments for 1974-75 through 2000-01) (on file, Florida State
University Law Review).
18. Id.
19. FLORIDA CONSENSUS ESTIMATING CONFERENCE, STATE OF FLORIDA BUDGET CASELOAD
FORECAST, BK. 4, VOL. 1, No. 2, at 60-61 (Spr. 1985) (on file with Jt. Legis. Mgt. Comm., Div.
of Econ. & Demographic Research).
20. Id. at 64, 66.
21. Fla. Legis., Jt. Legis. Mgt. Comm., Div. of Econ. & Demographic Research, Criminal
Justice News, Mar. 27, 1986 [hereinafter cited as Criminal Justice News].
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. FLORIDA DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, ANNUAL REPORT 1984-85, at 87.
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Florida during the next decade, contributing to increased demand
for prisons and correctional services. This pressure is in part at-
tributable to the expected increase in the segment of the popula-
tion most likely to be incarcerated-males between the ages of
eighteen and twenty-eight. After the last members of the baby
boom generation pass through the period in their lives when they
are most prone to commit crimes, some of the pressure may abate.
However, this change is not expected to occur in Florida before
1995.26
E. Strategic Implications
These demographic trends have important implications for long-
term planning. The subtle but critical changes in the state's popu-
lation will result in increased demands for state services and pres-
sure to raise additional revenues to meet increasing expenses. Pres-
sures resulting from these demands must be accommodated in a
planned, orderly, and flexible manner. Deviations from the existing
comprehensive plan must be expected and approved if they are
justified. In implementing its long-term plan, the state must estab-
lish priorities that reflect the most pressing concerns and require-
ments of state government.
II. ECONOMIC TRENDS
The strength and stability of the state's economy and its re-
sponse to national business cycles is a second fundamental aspect
of the planning process. Failure to anticipate and evaluate accu-
rately the significance of business cycles historically has played
havoc with state plans. Recessions typically occur without warning,
and the ensuing contractions create hardships and crises which di-
vert lawmakers from long-term goals to short-term crisis manage-
ment. Historically, national recessions have been followed at the
state level by revenue shortfalls, 26 difficult budget decisions," ris-
ing demand for state services,28 and political problems illustrated
by extended or special sessions.2 9 Recoveries, on the other hand,
offer a time for stability and improvement. Unfortunately, the
25. Criminal Justice News, supra note 21.
26. See infra notes 124-28 and accompanying text. See also Table IV.
27. See infra notes 130-36 and accompanying text.
28. See Table V.
29. See Fla. H.R., Office of the Clerk, History of Legislative Sessions Since Statehood
(June 1985) (on file with Clerk).
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length of recoveries is usually short, making it difficult to re-estab-
lish long-term objectives.
A. National Business Cycles
Since 1854 there have been thirty-one national business cycles
which encompassed recession and recovery. 0 Within these cycles,
the average recovery has been surprisingly short-less than three
years-while the average recession has lasted eighteen months.31
Innovations in econometric tools, computerization, and
econometric modeling have caused only a small improvement in
the duration and shape of national business cycles. The average
post-World War II recovery has lasted forty-two months, an
eleven-month improvement, while recessions during this modern
period have averaged a little less than one year."
In addition to the surprising brevity of business cycles, analysis
shows that sustained recoveries are rare. Only two of the thirty-one
recoveries have lasted longer than five years.33 Both of these recov-
eries were associated with wars: World War II (six years and eight
months) and Vietnam (eight years and ten months). Only three
peacetime recoveries have lasted longer than four years-those in
1933-37 (four years and two months), 1975-80 (four years and ten
months), and the current recovery, which is now in its fourth
year.3 4
While the recurring business cycle is an historic fact, most stra-
tegic planning is based on the assumption that there will be no
future recessions. Under this premise, long-term plans can be
achieved without agonizing disruptions. History, however, counsels
otherwise. Periodic economic recessions are the norm, not the ex-
ception. Historically, the business cycle has averaged forty-five
months.3 " Thus, planners should anticipate a major recession ap-
proximately every four years.
30. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BuREAu OF ECON. ANALYsIs, Bus. CONDITIONS DIG., July
1986, at 104 [hereinafter cited as Bus. CONDmONs DIG.].
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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TABLE II
SELECTED FLORIDA ECONOMIC VARIABLES
FISCAL YEAR 1970-71 THROUGH 1984-85
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Florida Florida Florida Florida Florida Sales Tax
Fiscal Pop. Pop. % Real Housing Unemploy. Liability
Year Change Change Income Starts % Rate % Change
(in 000's) % Change
1970-71 349.0 3.7 6.3 115,337 4.9 7.7
1971-72 474.6 6.3 8.6 195,056 4.9 13.7
1972-73 475.0 6.4 12.2 275,472 4.7 18.1
1973-74 399.7 5.6 6.4 219,257 4.8 15.1
1974-75* 131.0 2.6 (.5) 69,705 8.9 .3
1975-76 129.4 1.4 .8 58,135 9.9 4.4
1976-77 182.7 1.9 4.0 84,259 8.9 11.4
1977-78 244.7 2.5 7.8 138,835 7.0 17.5
1978-79 297.8 3.1 7.6 185,024 6.3 18.4
1979-80 298.0 3.1 5.5 171,554 5.7 15.9
1980-81 368.2 3.6 5.6 178,312 6.3 12.8
1981-82** 252.7 3.0 4.8 105,388 7.5 6.3
1982-83 213.9 2.0 3.0 136,443 8.8 4.3
1983-84 358.3 2.9 6.7 206,467 7.2 17.0
1984-85 354.2 3.4 6.7 186,745 6.2 10.5
* The recession of 1973-75 began in November 1973 and officially ended in March
1975.
** The recession of 1981-82 began in July 1981 and officially ended in November 1982.
Source: Florida Consensus Economic and Demographic Estimating Conference.
B. Description of Two Modern Recessions
Because periodic national recessions and recoveries are a perma-
nent fixture on the horizon, planners must assess Florida's eco-
nomic response to these cycles. Table II illustrates Florida's re-
sponse to national business cycles through a range of economic,
demographic, and tax variables.
Florida's reaction to the recessions of 1973-75 (1973) and 1981-
82 (1981) is particularly revealing. The recessions were similar in
length and severity, yet each had a significantly different effect on
Florida's economy. The two recessions each lasted approximately
eighteen months, making them the longest in post-World War II
history. 6 Both were marked by relatively high interest rates for
36. Id.
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their periods."7 After initial sharp declines in gross national prod-
uct (GNP) in the early stages of the downturn, each recession ap-
peared to be ending but then plunged deeper, producing the "W"
shape unique to post-World War II recessions.3 8
The 1973 recession was the most severe of the post-World War
II recessions39 and, at sixteen months, one of the longest.4" Begin-
ning in late 1973, real GNP declined 6.6%, well over twice the de-
cline of the previous worst post-World War II recession.41 The fun-
damental cause of this recession was worldwide inflation brought
on in part by easy monetary and fiscal policies prior to 1973, poor
crops in many parts of the world, and oil price increases by the
OPEC countries.42 With rising prices came an increase in interest
rates; they reached unprecedented levels in 1974.43 High inflation
coupled with high interest rates had a dramatic impact on the
stock market and the real estate sectors, which had experienced a
speculative surge prior to the recession.4 4 Construction was one of
the sectors hardest hit, with housing starts falling sixty-three per-
cent from 1973 to 1974. 45
As shown by Table II, the 1973 recession produced the worst ec-
onomic conditions in modern times in Florida. The severity of the
effect in Florida was due in part to high interest rates. Contribut-
ing factors were the speculative surges in the stock and real estate
markets and the resulting increase in economic growth immedi-
ately before the recession. For example, in fiscal years 1971 and
1972, Florida's population increased by 475,000, an extremely high
annual rate of more than 6%. Single and multi-family housing
starts peaked at 275,000 in 1972, a level not since replicated. Un-
employment rates, at 4.7 %, were well below the national average of
5.9%. Real personal income was exploding at 12.2%. 4
37. FLORIDA CONSENSUS ESTIMATING CONFERENCE, UNITED STATES & FLORIDA ECONOMIC
FORECAST, BK. 1, VOL. 2, at 26 (Spr. 1986) (Table 5) (on file with Jt. Legis. Mgt. Comm., Div.
of Econ. & Demographic Research) [hereinafter cited as U.S. & FLA. ECONOMIC FORECAST].
38. Fla. Legis., Jt. Legis. Mgt. Comm., Div. of Econ. & Demographic Research, official
state data base (on file, Florida State University Law Review).
39. L. VALENTINE & C. DAUTEN, BUSINESS CYCLES & FORECASTING 44 (6th ed. 1983).
40. Id. at 71.
41. Id. at 44-45.
42. Id. at 46-47.
43. Id. at 45.
44. Id. at 45, 47.
45. Id. at 45.
46. Fla. Legis., Jt. Legis. Mgt. Comm., Div. of Econ. & Demographic Research, computer
printout (July 21, 1986) (U.S. quarterly unemployment figures, 1948-1986) (printout on file,
Florida State University Law Review) [hereinafter cited as U.S. unemployment figures].
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When the recession hit Florida, the downturn was severe. Popu-
lation increases slowed to 1.4% by fiscal year 1975. Real personal
income declined by .5% in 1974. Housing starts declined 300%
from previous peaks. In the second quarter of 1975, the state un-
employment rate rose to 11.3%, far higher than the national rate
of 8.8% .7 The recovery from this recession was long and slow.
Florida lagged behind the national upturn by almost eighteen
months as the housing inventory was slowly eaten away. 48
The 1973 recession devastated the state's budget. For fiscal year
1974-75, the national inflation rate was 11%. 49 Although Florida
personal income grew by 9.2% and population by 2.6%, total sales
tax liability did not grow at all. For fiscal year 1975-76, with infla-
tion increasing by 7%,5O state personal income by 7.8%, and popu-
lation by 1.4%, total sales tax liability increased by 4.4% and gen-
eral revenue funds increased by only 2.2%. 51
The 1981 recession was the longest post-war recession, beginning
in July 1981 and lasting through November 1982.52 The immediate
cause of the recession and its duration are explained to a great ex-
tent by changes in monetary and fiscal policies. 5 Using monetary
policy to attack the double-digit inflation that had ravaged the na-
tional economy, the Federal Reserve Board adopted a policy of
consistent restrictive control of the growth of the domestic money
supply. 4 By 1981, the Federal Reserve Board was attempting to
control monetary growth at the lower limit of its target ranges.55
This policy, as economist Otto Eckstein noted, represented the
first commitment in American history to "defeat inflation by limit-
ing the growth of aggregate demand through high interest rates." 5
Restrictive monetary policy, which gradually brought inflation
down, also led to high interest rates which by the summer of 1981
caused the collapse of the housing and automobile sectors and
47. Id.
48. U.S. & FLA. ECONOMIC FORECAST, supra note 37, at 42-43 (Table 9).
49. Id. at 18 (Table 3) (reporting Consumer Price Index).
50. Id.
51. FLORIDA CONSENSUS ESTIMATING CONFERENCE, REVENUE ANALYSIS, FY 1970-71
THROUGH FY 1994-95, BK. 6, at 9 (Spr. 1986) (Table 1.1) (on file with Jt. Legis. Mgt. Comm.,
Div. of Econ. & Demographic Research) [hereinafter cited as REVENUE ANALYSIS].
52. BUs. CONDITIONS DIG., supra note 30, at 104.
53. Eckstein, Two Revolutions in Economic Policy, in DATA RESOURCES, INC., REVIEW OF
THE U.S. ECONOMY, at 1.1 (Sept. 1981).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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helped to lengthen the recession.57 Federal deficits, which required
financing in capital markets, sustained these high interest rates
and thus prolonged the recession."
For Florida, the effect of the 1981 recession was significantly dif-
ferent than that of the 1973 recession. As Table II indicates, Flor-
ida was in the midst of a short recovery. Population growth pre-
ceding the recession was good (3.6%), but not spectacular. Real
personal income was growing at 5.6%. Housing starts were running
at 178,000 units. Unemployment rates were high at 6.3%, but well
below the national average.59
When the recession hit, Florida did not lag behind the national
downturn as it had in 1973. As shown by Table II, population
growth slowed to 3%, housing starts were reduced to 105,000 units,
and Florida real personal income continued to increase at a fair
3 %. Unemployment rose to 8.8 %, high but well below the national
average of 10% .60 Instead of lagging behind the national upturn,
Florida led the recovery.61
The more moderate response of the Florida economy to the
1981-82 cycle was also reflected in the behavior of the General
Revenue Fund. Although inflation increased by 8.7%, Florida
personal income by 12.5%, and population by 3 %, general revenue
grew by only 4.7% .3 Although this rate of growth marked a signifi-
cant decline from the 13.6% increase for fiscal year 1980-81, it was
not nearly as drastic as the decline following the 1973 recession.6
C. Strategic Implications
Strategic planning based on the naive assumption that economic
growth will continue unabated can only result in long-term strate-
gies destined to fail. Straight-line forecasts foster the illusion that
goals can be achieved without agonizing disruptions. Unfortu-
nately, periodic recessions are a fact of life. The question is not
whether a recession will occur, but when.
57. U.S. & FLA. ECONOMIC FORECAST, supra note 37, at 26 (Table 5). Housing starts fell
from 1.36 million in 1980-81 to 92,000 in 1982-83.. New car sales fell by 880,000 during the
same period.
58. Eckstein, supra note 53, at 1.1.
59. U.S. unemployment figures, supra note 46.
60. Id.
61. U.S. & FLA. ECONOMIC FORECAST, supra note 37, at 16, 42.
62. Id. at 18.
63. REVENUE ANALYSIS, supra note 51, at 9 (Table 1.1).
64. Id.
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As part of Florida's long-term plan, the legislature in 1985 en-
acted the consensus forecasting law which provides for ten-year ec-
onomic forecasts using trend and business cycle assumptions.15
The law also requires that all state agencies use the forecasts in
planning and budgeting. 6 The current forecasts anticipate two re-
cessions during the next ten years.67 The first is anticipated to be-
gin in 1990 and the second in 1994.68 The 1994 recession is pre-
dicted to be more severe with real GNP showing almost no growth
for fiscal years 1993-94 and 1994-95. Fortunately, neither the
length nor the severity of these two recessions is expected to match
that of the 1973 or 1981 recessions.
Florida's economic response to the 1973 and 1981 recessions
points out problems which must be addressed in the long-term
planning process. Stereotypes of the strengths and weaknesses of
the Florida economy simply do not hold. Each business cycle is
unique. A sound long-term plan must anticipate the business cycle
and plan for its effect on the economy and state revenues.
III. TAX BASE ALTERNATIVES
Successful implementation of any long-term plan requires an un-
derstanding of the state's tax structure. While state tax codes are
admittedly complex, there are only three widely used and generally
accepted tax bases upon which a tax structure can be created: in-
come, wealth, and sales.69 All fifty states derive most of their tax
revenues from a combination of these three tax bases.70 Taxes on
these three bases respond differently to economic growth and na-
tional business cycles. Thus, the mixture of these bases in a state
tax structure determines to a large extent how the structure will
respond to economic forces. An overview of the general characteris-
tics of these three bases will serve as a foundation for classifying
and analyzing Florida's current tax structure.
65. Ch. 85-26, 1985 Fla. Laws 91 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 216.133-.137 (1985)).
66. FLA. STAT. § 216.135 (1985).
67. U.S. & FLA. ECONOMIC FORECAST, supra note 37, at 35-36.
68. Id. at 19 (Table 4).
69. R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 224 (2d ed.
1976) [hereinafter cited as MUSGRAVE].
70. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, SIGNIFICANT FEATURES OF FIS-
CAL FEDERALISM 171-222 (1984 ed.) (comparing general revenue sources for the states) [here-
inafter cited as SIGNIFICANT FEATURES OF FISCAL FEDERALISM].
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A. Income Taxes
Income taxes are typically levied on personal income in the form
of wages, salaries, dividends, interest, rents, or transfer payments,
or on corporate income in the form of corporate profits. According
to traditional circular flow analysis of income and expenditures,
which posits that a tax on income is equivalent to a tax on expend-
itures, the income tax reaches almost all economic activity.71
Therefore, the income tax base will parallel the movements of gen-
eral economic activity over the business cycle. Swings in personal
income will match swings in economic activity. Thus, during a re-
cession, the income tax base slows its growth or contracts; during a
recovery it rebounds.
The corporate income tax base is a small portion of total income.
In Florida, for example, corporate income represents only 7% to
12% of total income. 71 Corporate profits are volatile in nature,
fluctuating according to the national business cycle. During the
1981 recession, Florida corporate profits declined 25% for calendar
year 1982. 73 During the recovery, profits increased by 20.8% .7 The
fluctuation of corporate profits historically exceeds that of personal
income.75
B. Wealth Taxes
Wealth taxes are levied on individual or corporate assets or on
the transfer of those assets.76 Common wealth taxes include those
on real and tangible personal property" and intangible personal
property, 78 and estate and inheritance taxes.7 9 Taxes on real and
tangible personal property are typically assessed at market value
on a specified date by a local property appraiser. Taxes are then
levied against the assessed value or, in the case of the other wealth
bases, on the determined value of the estate, inheritance, or gift.
The largest component of the wealth tax base is real and tangi-
ble personal property, better known as the local property tax
71. MUSGRAVE, supra note 69, at 224-25.
72. Fla. Legis., Jt. Legis. Mgt. Comm., Div. of Econ. & Demographic Research, computer
printout (July 21, 1986) (printout on file, Florida State University Law Review).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See U.S. & FLA. ECONOMIC FORECAST, supra note 37, at 16, 25.
76. MUSGRAVE, supra note 69, at 342-43.
77. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 195.073 (1985).
78. See, e.g., id. ch. 199.
79. See, e.g., id. ch. 198.
19861
446 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:433
base.80 Because of the institutional characteristics of the assess-
ment process, the market value of the property tax base typically
fluctuates less radically than the economy as a whole.81
C. Sales or Transactions Taxes
Sales taxes are levied on the sale or use of goods and services.8 2
In circular flow analysis of income and expenditures, a tax on in-
come (wages, salaries, dividends, and rents, for example) equals a
tax on the uses of income (generally consumption and invest-
ment).83 Therefore, a general sales tax on all uses of income will
equal a tax on income. However, most states do not levy a general
sales tax on all uses of income. Instead, taxes are applied to broad
classes of consumption 84 or selective sales taxes are imposed on in-
dividual consumptive items, such as cigarettes,8 5 liquor,86 beer, 7 or
wine."8
There are two basic types of general sales taxes. Broad-based
sales taxes are applied to total consumption and investment with
few exemptions.8 9 Narrow-based sales taxes are applied to only se-
lected transactions but reduce the regressivity of the tax by ex-
empting food, medicine, and household utilities.90
A broad sales tax base will approximate an income tax base and
therefore respond to growth and business cycles in the same man-
ner as an income tax.9 1 Narrow-based sales taxes will experience
much sharper downturns during recessions and larger increases
during recovery.2 Narrow-based sales taxes do not grow in re-
sponse to the general economy but instead respond to demand for
the components of consumption and investment that are in the
80. MUSGRAVE, supra note 69, at 349. Between 1902 and 1972, the property tax provided
more than 80% of local revenue. Id. at 207 (Table 9-1), 209.
81. See id. The level of local taxation (total revenue as a percent of GNP) ranged be-
tween 3% and 5% from 1902 through the end of World War II. The ratio declined during
the 1940's, then rose to 4% during the 1950's. The percentage continued to increase during
the 1960's, but far less than other tax bases increased. Id.
82. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 212 (1985).
83. MUSGRAVE, supra note 69, at 224.
84. Id. at 327.
85. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 210 (1985).
86. See, e.g., id. § 565.12.
87. See, e.g., id. § 563.05.
88. See, e.g., id. § 564.06.
89. MUSGRAVE, supra note 69, at 327.
90. Id. at 327-28.
91. Id. at 225.
92. See Table II (illustrating the behavior of Florida's narrow-based sales tax).
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base. By exempting necessities and services, which are stable and
do not decline dramatically during recessions, narrow-based sales
taxes must rely on the more volatile components of consumption
and investment for revenues. In addition, because national con-
sumptive patterns have shifted to services and away from durable
and nondurable goods, these bases do not keep pace with the over-
all growth in the economy.
A variant of the narrow-based sales tax, the selective sales tax, is
applied to an even more restricted component of consumption. Se-
lective sales taxes are applied to particular products such as ciga-
rettes, beverages, and gasoline.9 3 These taxes are typically unit-
based, in that the tax rate is applied to the number of units sold
rather than the value of the product sold. Unit-based taxes grow as
consumption of the unit increases but do not grow with inflation or
increased economic productivity.
D. Tax Bases Compared
Table III compares the growth rates of the three major tax bases
using Florida data. The first two columns present two versions of
the sales tax base: column (1) shows the rate of increase in total
sales tax liability while column (2) presents the growth rate of the
cigarette tax base, a typical unit-based selective sales tax. Column
(3) lists the growth rate in the county taxable property base, and
column (4) the growth rate in Florida personal income.
The income tax base exhibits the properties expected of such a
base over the business cycle. Growth rates slowed during recession
and increased during expansion. Due to inflation and population
growth, the state's income tax base grew steadily. Total personal
income increased at an annual average rate of 12.7% between 1971
and 1985.
The unit-based, selective sales tax also grew as expected. Major
growth in unit-based sales tax bases occurs with significant in-
creases in population or when tax law changes shift consumptive
patterns between two fiscal years. Average annual growth for the
fifteen-year period equaled 3.8%, approximately the same as the
overall increase in state population.
93. MUSGRAVE, supra note 69, at 328.
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TABLE III
SELECTED FLORIDA ECONOMIC AND TAX VARIABLES
FISCAL YEARS 1970-71 THROUGH 1982-83
(1)
General
Sales
Taxes
7.8%
13.7
18.0
14.9
(2)
Selective
Sales
Tax
7.4%
5.4
8.5
8.5
(3)
Florida
Property
Tax
15.5%
13.5
8.5
29.2
(4)
Florida
Personal
Income
11.1%
13.5
17.0
15.5
.3 2.3 37.3 9.2
4.5 1.9 13.0 7.8
Fiscal
Year
1970-71.
1971-72
1972-73
1973-74
1974-75*
1975-76
1976-77
1977-78
1978-79
1979-80
1980-81
1981-82**
1982-83
1983-84
1984-85
Growth
Rate 11.4%
3.0
.6
1.7
7.0
5.2
2.4
(1.1)
1.3
3.4
3.8%
7.3
9.4
9.2
8.4
27.2
23.5
13.1
7.5
9.4
15.1%
10.0
15.1
16.4
16.5
16.5
12.5
7.8
10.8
10.7
12.7%
* The recession of 1973-75 began in November 1973 and officially ended in March
1975.
** The recession of 1981-82 began in July 1981 and officially ended in November 1982.
Source: Florida Consensus Revenue and Economic Estimating Conference.
The property tax base responds erratically to major changes in
administration. Substantial growth in this base occurred during
periods of significant assessment practice reform . 4 This tax base
produced an annual growth rate of 15.1%.
The general sales tax base demonstrates the widest fluctuations.
It showed almost no growth during the mid-1970's recession but
increased 18.6% later in the decade during the period of double-
94. See Table IV. In Florida, significant assessment practice changes were made in 1973,
ch. 73-172, 1973 Fla. Laws 331, and in 1980, ch. 80-274, 1980 Fla. Laws 1143.
11.5
17.6
18.6
15.4
13.0
6.3
4.5
16.8
10.6
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digit inflation. The general sales tax base grew by an average of
only 11.4%, less than the growth in Florida personal income.
E. Strategic Implications
In summary, a tax structure which relies heavily on an income
tax base will experience growth paralleling the general growth of
the state's economy. Such a tax structure will contract during re-
cessions and rebound during expansions. Throughout the business
cycle, revenue growth will match that of the overall economy.
States which tax personal income at a progressive rate typically
will experience revenue growth faster than the growth of the gen-
eral economy, particularly during periods of rapid inflation.
Broad-based sales taxes will exhibit the same general properties
as a personal income tax. Narrow-based sales taxes, on the other
hand, will respond more radically to the business cycle, and reve-
nue will not keep pace with economic growth. Selective sales-based
taxes, particularly unit-based taxes levied on such items as ciga-
rettes, beverages, and legalized forms of gambling, likewise will not
keep pace with economic growth. In general, these taxes will grow
only in response to changes in population or changes in consumer
tastes and preferences for those items.
Wealth tax bases will respond to the business cycle less violently
than the narrow-based sales tax. However, substantial changes in
the wealth tax bases can occur with major changes in institutional-
ized assessment practices.
IV. FLORIDA'S TAX STRUCTURE
The state's taxing structure is the focal point of any long-term
strategic planning process. The tax structure determines whether
the state's obligations to match federal funds, assist local govern-
ments, and fund the operating and infrastructure needs of state
government can be met. The Florida Constitution reserves to the
state the general authority to levy taxes.9 5 However, it imposes sev-
eral important limitations on the legislature's ability to raise reve-
nues. The state may not impose an ad valorem tax on real or tangi-
ble personal property.9 6 Thus, state use of the major wealth-based
95. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 1(a).
96. Id. Ad valorem taxes, except for intangibles taxes, are reserved to local government.
Id. § 9. However, local governments are restricted in their use of ad valorem taxes. Id. (im-
posing millage limitations on cities, counties,. school districts, and water management
districts).
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tax is prohibited. Moreover, the state may not impose a personal
income tax.9 7 Although it may impose a limited tax on corporate
income,98 the state is effectively precluded from imposing the sec-
ond of the three basic kinds of taxes, leaving only the sales tax
base to raise revenues for government services.
While restricting the legislature's ability to raise taxes, the con-
stitution allows the legislature to delegate some taxing authority to
local governments. 9 In addition, local governments may benefit in-
directly from taxes levied and collected by the state and then
shared with local governments.10
A. State Funds
The state's current tax structure is maintained through three
funds-the General Revenue Fund, trust funds, and the Working
Capital Fund.10' For fiscal year 1984-85, direct receipts to the state
totaled $12.2 billion.102 Of that amount, general revenue totaled
$6.3 billion and state trust funds amounted to $5.9 billion. 03 The
Working Capital Fund receives revenues only by transfers of sur-
pluses from the General Revenue Fund.'04
1. General Revenue Fund
Because of its pivotal nature, the General Revenue Fund will be
the focus of this analysis. General revenue funds -support many
programs, including operating and capital outlay needs for univer-
sities, criminal justice programs, environmental and natural re-
sources programs, and general government services. 0 5 The General
Revenue Fund is also used to supplement shortages in state regula-
tory trust funds and thus to support state agencies such as the De-
partments of Agriculture,0 6 Banking and Finance, 0 7 and Insur-
ance. 08 The General Revenue Fund provides state matching funds
97. Id. § 5(a).
98. Id. § 5(b).
99. Id. § 9.
100. Id. § 8.
101. FLA. STAT. § 215.32 (1985),.
102. REVENUE ANALYSIS, supra note 51, at 3.
103. Id.
104. FLA. STAT. § 215.32(2)(c) (1985).
105. STAFF OF FLA. H.R. & S. COMMS. ON APPROP., FLORIDA'S FIScAL ANALYSIS IN BRIEF
1986, at 1 (on file with committees).
106. Id. at 84.
107. Id. at 87.
108. Id. at 103-04.
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FIGURE I
FISCAL YEAR 1984-85 LEGISLATIVE APPROPRIATIONS
GENERAL REVENUE FUND
4.3% General Government1 / 10.4% Universities
5.4% Community
20.4% Social Services Colleges
1.9% Other
Education
1.2% Natural
Resources
10.8% CriminalJustice
1.1% Salary Increase
44.5% K-12 Education
Source: Florida House and Senate Committees on Appropriations.
for federal programs, particularly those providing indigent care
and education.109 At the local level, general revenue funds are used
to help finance public schools and community colleges. 110 The
Fund has even been used periodically to provide local property tax
relief"' Figure I shows the apportionment of the General Revenue
Fund for fiscal year 1984-85.
Although the General Revenue Fund serves as the cornerstone of
the state budgeting process, limitations on the use of wealth and
income tax bases and statutory limitations on the use of the sales
tax base mean the Fund relies primarily on the general sales tax
for revenues. Figure II shows the composition of Florida's General
Revenue Fund for fiscal year 1984-85. Because necessities such as
food, medicine, and household utilities, as well as personal and
professional services and economic development incentives, are ex-
empted from taxation,"' the general sales tax necessarily depends
on a narrow and volatile subset of economic activity. Figure III il-
lustrates the composition of Florida's general sales tax in fiscal
year 1984-85. The taxes attributable to durable goods expenditures
originate from sales of consumptive items such as automobiles,
109. Id. at 56-69.
110. Id. at 37, 40.
111. See, e.g., ch. 77-476, 1977 Fla. Laws 2100; ch. 74-264, 1974 Fla. Laws 711.
112. See FLA. STAT. § 212.07-.084 (1985).
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FIGURE II
COMPOSITION OF THE GENERAL REVENUE FUND
FISCAL YEAR 1984-85
3.7% Other
3.4% Wealth Tax
8.9% Income Tax
16% Selective
Sales Tax
68% General
Sales Tax
Source: Florida Consensus Revenue Estimating Conference.
washers, dryers, and television sets. Items such as residential hous-
ing, commercial construction, and business investments make up
the investment expenditures category while recreational expendi-
tures include discretionary items such as hotel accommodations,
restaurants, and attractions. Nondurable mall expenditures include
general merchandising activity.
These components of the General Revenue Fund are highly re-
cession-prone. During recessions, consumers postpone purchases of
durable goods. New house purchases are delayed and extensive va-
cations postponed. Shopping centers and malls attract less busi-
ness; restaurant-dining and movie-going are curtailed. Addition-
ally, during recessions, particularly recessions with high interest
rates, business investment is reduced, housing construction slows,
and the stock market declines.
The highly volatile nature of these components of the general
revenue tax structure affects the growth pattern of the General
Revenue Fund across the business cycle. Figure IV illustrates the
vulnerability of the Fund to business cycles. The graph shows that
growth in the General Revenue Fund has been one of periodic
booms and busts. Most importantly, the long-term direction of the
Fund has been one of continuous decline over the past fifteen
years, indicating that the booms do not offset the busts. This ever-
declining peak growth rate is a result of the tax structure's exces-
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FIGURE III
COMPOSITION OF FLORIDA'S GENERAL
FISCAL YEAR 1984-85
24% Durable Goods
Expenditures
26.8 % Investment " .
Expenditures
Source: Florida Consensus Revenue Estimating Conference.
SALES TAX
29.7% Nondurable
Mall Expenditures
18.9% Recreational
Expenditures
sive dependence on hard goods consumption at a time when a
growing proportion of income is being devoted to necessities and
personal and professional services, all of which are exempt.
The fact that the General Revenue Fund does not keep pace
with growth is also reflected in the share of personal income which
supports the Fund. In 1970, Floridians paid 4.4% of their personal
income to state general revenue taxes.115 This proportion increased
to 5% in 1971 after enactment of the corporate income tax. 14 It
declined steadily to 4% by 1981-82 and then increased to 4.3% by
1984-85115 after major changes in the tax laws.116 As Figure V indi-
cates, for the fifteen-year period from 1970 to 1985, the tax burden
as measured by tax paid as a percentage of personal income
declined.
Unfortunately, tax law changes mask the severity of this trend
and the instability it creates. Total general revenue increase result-
113. REVENUE ANALYSIS, supra note 51, at 6 (Table 1.2).
114. Ch. 71-984, 1972 Fla. Laws 57 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 232.01 (1985)).
115. REVENUE ANALYSIS, supra note 51, at 6 (Table 1.2).
116. Major tax law changes during this period include a general sales tax increase, ch.
82-154, 1982 Fla. Laws 450 (11, to state government, 1/ to local governments); increased
beverage taxes in 1983, ch. 83-348, 1983 Fla. Laws 2323; in 1977, ch. 77-407, 1977 Fla. Laws
1711; in 1971, ch. 71-361, 1971 Fla. Laws 1877; and imposition of the corporate income tax,
ch. 71-984, 1972 Fla. Laws 57.
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FIGURE IV
GROWTH RATE OF THE GENERAL REVENUE FUND
FISCAL YEARS 1970-71 TO 1984-85
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Source: Florida Consensus Revenue Estimating Conference.
ing from major tax law changes from 1970-71 to 1984-85 had the
effect of increasing general revenue by $1.3 billion for fiscal year
1984-85.117 In other words, had there been no change in the tax
laws since 1970, the percentage of personal income going to the
General Revenue Fund would have been reduced to 3.4%." s
Clearly, Florida's narrow-based sales tax structure if left alone
would not have kept pace with growth.
In summary, Florida's General Revenue Fund, the major source
of money for state services, has been extremely cyclical, more vola-
tile than the economy as a whole, and has declined as a share of
personal income over the past fifteen years. By such measures, the
117. Memorandum from Alan Johansen, Legislative Economist, House Committee on Fi-
nance and Taxation, Florida Legislature, to James Zingale, Staff Director, House Committee
on Appropriations, Florida Legislature (Sept. 12, 1986) (major tax increases since 1970) (on
file, Florida State University Law Review).
118. In fiscal year 1984-85, general revenue collections totaled $6,270.8 billion. REVENUE
ANALYSIS, supra note 51, at 7. Real personal income for the same fiscal year totaled $133.297
billion. Id. at 83. General revenue as a percent of Florida income thus equaled 4.3%. Sub-
tracting the $1,318.8 billion realized from these tax increases results in the 3.4% figure.
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FIGURE V
SHARE OF FLORIDA PERSONAL INCOME WHICH SUPPORTS
THE STATE GENERAL REVENUE FUND
FISCAL YEARS 1970-71 TO 1984-85
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Source: Florida Consensus Revenue Estimating Conference.
tax burden has been declining since 1970, leaving Florida with a
1984 national tax burden ranking forty-fourth.1 9
2. General Revenue Forecast
According to the ten-year Florida revenue forecasts prepared by
the Florida Consensus Estimating Conference, the behavior of the
General Revenue Fund will exhibit the same properties over the
next decade as it has in the past. The forecasts are based on two
assumptions: there will be two moderate recessions over the next
ten years, and there will be no change in current state tax laws or
tax administration throughout the forecast period. 20
The two predicted recessions will cause growth rates to slow sig-
nificantly-to 3.1% in response to the 1989 recession and to 2.1%
119. STATE POL'Y REP., Jan. 10, 1986, at 5.
120. REVENUE ANALYSIS, supra note 51, at 33.
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in the 1993 recession.'21 According to the trend forecast, the 1989
recession will cause a loss in general revenue of $484.1 million for
fiscal year 1991-92, while the 1994 recession will cause a loss of
$354.2 million. 22
Additionally, the trend forecast shows a continued decline in the
General Revenue Fund as a share of personal income-from 4.4%
in 1986 to 4.1% in 1995.123 The cycle forecast predicts a similar
decline. 124 General revenue in fiscal year 1994-95 will be approxi-
mately $1.6 billion less than if the relative share of personal in-
come paid into the Fund had remained at 4.5%.126
3. Errors in the General Revenue Fund Estimate
The inherent volatility of a narrow-based sales tax structure not
only creates instability in terms of funds available but also makes
exact revenue forecasting difficult. Table IV highlights the problem
of forecasting the highly recession-sensitive General Revenue
Fund. The table shows errors in General Revenue Fund estimates
and reveals the difficult task that forecasters have had in accu-
rately anticipating recessions. National recessions typically pro-
duce revenue shortfalls. For fiscal years 1974-75 and 1975-76, the
general revenue error was 10% and 3.1%, respectively. The 1980
and 1981 recessions caused shortfalls in the revenue forecast of
5.2% and 4.7%, respectively, for fiscal years 1981-82 and 1982-83.
The shortfalls of 1974 and 1975 caused midyear holdbacks-that
is, mandatory spending reductions imposed on state agencies by
the Administration Commission-of 5.5% in 1974 26 and 2.0% in
1975.12' The revenue shortfalls of 1981 required a $195.9 million
transfer from the Working Capital Fund reserve to general revenue
appropriations.'28 The 1982 revenue shortfall of $203.8 million 12 in
121. Id. at 63 (Table 3.1).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 35 (Table 2.2).
124. Id. at 61 (Table 3.2).
125. Id.
126. STAFF OF FLA. H.R. & S. COMMS. ON APPROP., FISCAL ANALYSIS IN BRIEF 1975, at 2
(June 1975) (on file with committee).
127. STAFF OF FLA. H.R. & S. COMMS. ON APPROP., FISCAL ANALYSIS IN BRIEF 1976, at 2
(July 1976) (on file with committees).
128. STAFF OF FLA. H.R. & S. COMMS. ON APPROP., FISCAL ANALYSIS IN BRIEF 1982, at 6
(May 1982) (on file with committees).
129. STAFF OF FLA. H.R. & S. COMMS. ON APPROP., FISCAL ANALYSIS IN BRIEF 1983, at 6
(Aug. 1983) (on file with committees).
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TABLE IV
HISTORY OF CONSENSUS REVENUE ESTIMATING CONFERENCE
ERRORS IN THE GENERAL REVENUE FUND ESTIMATE
Fiscal Dollar Percentage
Year Error Error
1973-74 $159.9 8.2%
1974-75 (232.5) (10.0)
1975-76 (67.8) (3.1)
1976-77 18.0 .8
1977-78 205.7 8.0
1978-79 367.5 12.9
1979-80 223.4 6.4
1980-81 198.4 5.0
1981-82 (240.7) (5.2)
1982-83 (244.2) (4.7)
1983-84 25.8 .4
1984-85 (28.5) (.4)
Source: Joint Legislative Management Committee, Division of Economic and Demo-
graphic Research.
the working capital transfer necessitated holdbacks totaling $325.8
million in order to balance general revenue appropriations for fis-
cal year 1982-83.130
B. Strategic Implications
Florida's tax base is one of the most restrictive in the nation.131
The constitutional and statutory limitations on the use of property
and personal income taxes leave the state with only one major tax
base-the sales tax. Thus, the current tax structure relies almost
exclusively on this tax base. Florida's narrow-based sales tax struc-
ture is highly cyclical. It has not and will not keep pace with
growth in the state's personal income. Unless it is changed, state
revenues will continue to decline as a percentage of personal in-
come. The volatile nature of the general sales tax base and the
130. Id. at 7.
131. See SIGNIFICANT FEATURES OF FISCAL FEDERALISM, supra note 70, at 171-222 (com-
paring tax bases of the states).
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unit-based selective sales tax, which provide no growth to offset
inflation, will continue to exert fiscal drag on the tax structure.
V. ANATOMY OF A FISCAL CRISIS
The sequence of events which historically causes budgeting and
planning problems begins with an unanticipated downturn in na-
tional economic activity signaling the beginning of a recession. The
sensitivity of the taxing structure to these downturns causes sharp
declines in revenues which historically have not been accurately
anticipated. Falling revenues thus create budget shortfalls which,
because of constitutional provisions," 2 must be offset by spending
reductions. These reductions typically take the form of layoffs,
program reductions, cancellation of capital outlay projects, travel
restrictions, and hiring freezes,'133 all of which usually occur mid-
way through the state's fiscal year.
The initial phase of a recession is followed by rising demand for
recession-sensitive services. These service demands increase rap-
idly at a time when appropriations are reduced and growth in reve-
nues is slowing dramatically. Table V illustrates the effect of two
recent recessions, 1981-82 and 1982-83, on state services.
In 1981, the number of unemployment claims filed by Floridians
increased by 15.3%. But it increased by 25.5% and 23.4%, respec-
tively, in the following two recession years. Rising unemployment
also causes increased crime which puts pressure on the criminal
justice system. This rise is initially felt by local law enforcement
agencies, and subsequently is reflected in the increased caseload
for courts, state attorneys, and public defenders. Finally, increases
in the prison population result in prison overcrowding crises. For
example, the 1980 recession was a major contributor to a 9.4% in-
crease in the prison population in 1981-82 over the previous fiscal
year. In the two following fiscal years, the prison population in-
creased by 21.2% and 5.6%, respectively.
132. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 1(d).
133. See, e.g., Memorandum from John T. Herndon, Director, Office of Planning and
Budgeting, to Governor Graham and Members of the Cabinet (Nov. 1981) (Revised Finan-
cial Plan 1981-82) (on file, Florida State University Law Review); memorandum from Lieu-
tenant Governor J.H. Williams, Secretary of Administration, to Governor Askew and Mem-
bers of the Cabinet (Dec. 8, 1975) (Revised Financial Plan 1975-76) (on file, Florida State
University Law Review).
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TABLE V
EFFECTS OF A RECESSION ON DEMAND FOR SELECTED STATE
SERVICES
(1) (2) (3) (5)
Unemployment Prison AFDC Com. College
Compensation Pop. Caseload Enrollment
Claims % % Change % Change Change
Change
1979-80" (7.1) 1.0 8.9
1980-81 15.3 (1.8) 9.0 7,230.9
1981-82** 25.5 9.4 (3.2) 8,611.0
1982-83 23.4 21.2 5.4 3,586.4
1983-84 (14.9) 5.6 5.8 (2,535.0)
1984-85 (10.1) (4.5) 0.2 (6,460.8)
* The recession of 1980 began in January 1980 and officially ended in June 1980.
** The recession of 1981-82 began in July 1981 and officially ended in November 1982.
Source: Florida Consensus Estimating Conference.
Deteriorating economic conditions also significantly affect fed-
eral indigent care programs for which the state provides a
mandatory match. For example, the AFDC program tends to in-
crease during a recession. AFDC caseload increased by 9% follow-
ing the 1980 recession and by 5.4% and 5.8%, respectively, in the
two years following the 1982 recession.
Rising unemployment increases demand for higher education,
particularly vocational education available through the community
college system. The three fiscal years following the 1980 recession
saw community college enrollments increase by 19,428 students.
These recession-related factors-falling revenues, errors in the
revenue estimate, mandatory holdbacks, and increasing demand
for a variety of state services-create a syndrome of fiscal crisis
that can radically disrupt long-term planning and budgeting. The
effect of the 1973 recession on Florida's annual budget exemplifies
this phenomenon. When the recession was fully felt in Florida,
general sales tax revenues did not grow.'" This unanticipated
slowdown produced budget shortfalls of 10% in fiscal year 1974-75
and 3.1% the following year.385 To meet constitutional balanced
budget requirements, the Administration Commission imposed a
134. See Table III.
135. See Table IV.
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5.5% holdback on state appropriations for fiscal year 1974 and a
2% holdback for fiscal year 1975.136 The 1974 holdback was partic-
ularly harsh because the shortfall was not fully recognized until
late in the fiscal year.
The effect of the recession on the political leadership was even
more dramatic. Governor Reubin Askew began his tenure on a
platform ardently opposed to a sales tax increase. In his Fair Share
tax reform program, Governor Askew called for imposition of a
corporate income tax, and stated that "this Administration cannot,
and will not, accept another penny increase in the sales tax. ' 137 By
1977, the effects of the recession on the state had caused Governor
Askew to reverse his position. Noting that recession and inflation
had dramatically depressed state tax collections, and that growing
demands on state services could not be met otherwise, Governor
Askew proposed a twenty-five percent increase in the sales tax,
from four to five cents on the dollar. 138 Although that increase was
forestalled in favor of other tax increases, Governor Askew's expe-
rience shows that unanticipated recessions can devastate the best-
laid plans of Florida's political leadership. Any state plan that does
not take into account the likelihood of future economic reverses
will be short sighted and destined to fail.
VI. CONCLUSION
Recessions historically have reduced state revenues at the same
time that economic adversity has increased the demand for state
services. The outcome has been a fiscal crisis for Florida govern-
ment that has been "solved" only by increases in existing taxes.
While these increases have given the appearance of enlarging the
revenue base, in fact the result has been that the expanded tax
base merely offsets the continuing revenue declines caused by the
peculiar nature of the tax base. When comparable downturns occur
in the future, aggravated by explosive population growth, the legis-
lature's ability to implement the State Comprehensive Plan will be
all but destroyed. Instead of focusing on execution of the state
plan, policy-making will degenerate into an annual exercise in cri-
sis management.
136. STAFF OF FLA. H.R. & S. COMMS. ON APPROP., FISCAL ANALYSIS IN BRIEF 1975, at 2
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TAX REVENUES
To prevent this occurrence, state policymakers should consider
reforming Florida's tax structure to eliminate the economic vagar-
ies caused by over-reliance on a narrow-based sales tax. Broaden-
ing the sales tax base through repeal of the exemptions for nones-
sential items would be an important first step, but only that. It
would provide needed revenues at a critical time. Unfortunately,
the 7.9% increase in available revenues that would result from re-
peal of all the exemptions currently under review would address
only partially the state's urgent needs.
Over the long term, Florida's tax base must be reformed so it
will generate sufficient revenue for high-quality services and pro-
vide stability over the course of national business cycles. This goal
can be attained only by systematically expanding the state's reli-
ance on all three tax bases-sales, income, and wealth. Tax reform
will allow state government to smooth out the boom-or-bust cycles
that now bedevil state planning and budgeting. Otherwise, the fu-
ture will look much like the past, with erratic delivery of public
services. In the absence of tax reform the growth management poli-
cies adopted by the Florida Legislature in 1985 run the risk of in-
creasing expectations beyond what can realistically be achieved.
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